RESEARCH REPORT

COMMUNITY SELF-HELP

AS STRATEGY AND OUTCOME

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ABSTRACT

The emerging interest in community self-help reflects a paradigm shift -- a new world-wide configuration in perceptions of the welfare state, and of the role of citizens and locality based institutions in its development and management. It also reflects the growing strength and importance of self-help groups, neighborhood associations, and informal networks of people at the grass-roots level who interact around special interests and common causes. In Israel this interest is expressed in the growth of new community self-help associations (CSAs). Examples include the local community centers (matnasim), the neighborhood associations (minhalot), Agudat Eshel and Project Renewal (shikum shchunot).

Part I of this paper details the emergence of community self-help and its two parallel concerns: (1) social problem-solving and services planning, and (2) social development or emergent planning. The uses and abuses of behavioral science knowledge to aid in the community self-help process and contrasted with ordinary (everyday) knowledge and with other decision-making approaches based on interactions and social learning.

Intervention strategies employed by CSAs are examined within the context of the problems and challenges they face. A framework of concepts from the behavioral sciences is presented and suggestions made for how it might be used heuristically for decision-making and action. Work on Part I was conducted at the Brookdale Institute of Gerontology and Adult Human Development in Israel and was made possible through a grant by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee - Israel. The report results from a preliminary assessment project focusing on four community self-help associations: local

operations of Project Renewal; local Eshel councils; local community centers and neighborhood associations affiliated with the Jerusalem Project. It was prepared by Armand Lauffer and Howard Litwin.

Part II was prepared a year earlier. It poses a number of issues and options pertaining to both the purposes and the operations of Jerusalem's minhalot. Minhalot functions -- such as service development, coordination of delivery -- are examined in detail against the background of shifting sources of legitimacy and of necessary resources. Change strategies that include multiple goals and target systems are examined. The variables that must be taken into account in establishing a minhelet (geographical area, participation {and membership) are examined in relation to definitions of the "functions of community". Part II concludes with an inventory and a check list of decisions for developing and managing a CSA and the community self-help process.

Most of the work on Part II was also funded by the JDC but was completed a year earlier when Armand Lauffer served as a consultant to the Hanhalah (Executive Board) of the Jerusalem Project for Neighborhood Self-Improvement. Parts I and II deal with very similar issues, however. The two sections complement each other in that they both analyze and draw on similar behavioral science/knowledge and methods relevant to community self-help and to community self-help associations in Israel.

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Part I COMPREHENDING THE STRUCTURES AND OPERATIONS OF COMMUNITY SELF-HELP ASSOCIATIONS

A. IMPROVING COMMUNITY SELF-HELP

The Emerging Interest in Community Self-Help

Community self-help is an idea whose time seems to have arrived (almost). Interested in the slowing or reversal of bureaucratic growth, national governments in most industrialized states are progressively turning over authority for problem-solving and for service delivery to smaller, localized units. Decision-making and planning in these units often involve citizen/volunteers working in collaboration with professionals. These processes are paralleled by an almost phenomenal expansion in consumer activism in service development and delivery. Sometimes termed the "self-help revolution", this involvement is reflected in the rapid growth of neighborhood associations, self-help or mutual aid groups, and networks of persons engaged in locally based problem-solving.

A variety of explanations for such converging developments are often postulated by their proponents as well as more objective observers. First, consumer-initiated self-help activities tend to be more immediate, responsive, and personal than the institutionalized services that are the creatures of the welfare state. The growth of self-help as a major force parallels an expanding challenge to rigid, bureaucratic structures, whether under public or private auspices, in an effort to humanize those structures by directly influencing or bypassing them. Finally, there is a growing sense throughout the industrialized world that services can be delivered more effectively, less expensively, and more flexibly if they are planned, coordinated, and supported at the local level (Kotler, 1983; Davis and Boston,

1983; Lauffer and Newman, 1982).

These emerging perceptions reflect what we will call a "paradigm shift", a new configuration of perceptions about the welfare state on the one hand, and the role of citizens in society on the other (Warren, 1985). The emergence of new forms of organization, which we call "community self-help associations" (CSAs) are both a cause and consequence of the paradigm shift. CSAs are locally-based organizations in which citizens/volunteers and professionals participate in some form of structured interaction aimed at developing plans, resources, and social services. In all cases, the authority for their efforts is delegated from some more central - usually a governmental - source.

In Israel, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee - referred to hereafter as the Joint, or JDC - has performed a central role in promoting the idea of community self-help by focusing on local social development, community-based services, decentralization of local government and, more recently, locally-based economic development. Sometimes alone, sometimes in partnership with the Israeli government, the JDC has been a major source of support for the emergence of community self-help associations. These include community centers (matnasim), local Eshel councils (agudot) for planning and coordination of services for the aging, and the Jerusalem Project neighborhood councils (minhalot). It has indirectly facilitated some of the work in other community self-help activities, including Project Renewal. The Joint's efforts in these areas has been remarkably far-sighted, anticipating ideological and structural changes in Israeli society.

Nevertheless, as in any developmental effort, sometimes too much, and at other times too little, is expected of a particular structure or process. Each of the CSAs mentioned have developed in ways that could not be fully anticipated or planned for in advance. Efforts to assess their current state of development are hampered by lack of a comprehensive conceptual framework for evaluation, and by competing views about that which may be either desirable or feasible. This paper is a modest effort to add some insights to the deliberations currently underway within the JDC and in the central bodies of these community self-help associations themselves.

Social Planning: Social Problem-Solving and Social Development

The success of community self-help is often measured through the assessment of social planning efforts at the local level. Social planning is generally defined as a concerted effort to engage in problem-solving and decision-making leading to social service program development. Planning activities include problem definition, goals and means selection, the mobilization of necessary resources, and the progressive overcoming of resistance to goal attainment.

Planning has variously been defined as: a rational and synoptic set of activities; a transactive process in which consensus is gradually arrived at through interactions; or an incremental and disjointed process of adjustment leading towards the approximation of desired ends. Few definitions of social planning are fully satisfactory. They tend to differ considerably from each other in terms of emphasis on ideology, style, or technology.

More important, most definitions do not adequately discriminate between social planning as "social problem-solving" or as "social

development". Social problem-solving generally focuses on: (a) the improvement or expansion of services and their coordination; or (b) on enhancing the capacity of citizens and communities to take responsible action. In contrast, social development envisions a restructuring of institutional relationships to achieve a better society, one in which individuals and institutions can actualize their potential. It is often seen as a process that is indistinguishable from its end; that is, the more effective the process, the closer the approximation to the desired goal.

These distinctions have an important bearing on the evaluation of CSA activities. If community self-help is seen as a strategy leading to more effective social problem-solving, it is essentially a means and the ends can be measured in terms of solutions like increased services or expanded accessibility to them. When seen as an integrated ends-means continuum, the ends are measured in more ephemeral terms. The strategies used are themselves a measure of outcome. These distinctions are dealt with more fully in Section D of Part I.

Behavioral Sciences as the Source for Understanding and Guiding Community Self-Help

Behavioral scientists have long been interested in comprehending the structural variables that contribute to, or detract from, community self-help as either strategy or outcome. Citizens and professionals involved in the community self-help process and policymakers who attempt to shape its directions have sought, through the behavioral sciences, an understanding of the processes in which they are engaged and techniques for improving those processes.

In Section B, we explore both the promise and the limitations of behavioral science knowledge. In Section C, we explore the behavioral

science literature for conceptual constructs that can be useful both in comprehending community self-help and in providing action guidelines for policy-making and practice.

Problems Endemic to Community Self-Help

In addition to the wide range of problems that are normally associated with social planning, and related concerns with service coordination and resource development, efforts to promote community self-help seem to generate problems of their own. Of particular interest is the frequent reference to these problems to justify the call for greater citizen participation and decentralization of authority, while they are often the very consequences of participation and decentralization.

The problems listed below were raised by representatives of each of the four types of community self-help associations where interviews were conducted over a two year period. Jerusalem's minhalot (neighborhood self-improvement councils); Project Renewal (urban-social service-educational renewal in disadvantaged neighborhoods throughout the country); matnasim (community centers throughout the country); Eshel agudot (coordinating councils for programs for the elderly outside of Jerusalem). We have divided the observed problems into two categories: (a) those emerging from the participation process; and (b) those that are both consequence and corollary to decentralization.

a. Problems Concomitant with Participation

1. The creation of successful and enduring CSAs often results in the creation of new elites (both among the professionals and among

citizen participants). Although a new power center may emerge at the local level, it is not necessarily any more responsive to local needs than more distant planning or authority structures. Accountability measures are likely to be ad hoc.

2. Participation is rarely widespread; in only a few places was there active participation of more than 10% of the population. Those citizens who do participate often are those who stand to benefit personally through participation and/or who represent a higher-than-average social/cultural/economic and educational level. These are often people who might have been able to gain some of the benefits they seek by participation in the CSA through other means. The poor, less educated, and less capable residents are least likely to participate. Where they do, their involvement tends not to add significantly to the process of decision-making. Thus, the development of participatory mechanisms often leads to the greater distancing of those who are potential "haves" from the potential "have-nots", a paradoxical and troubling outcome.

3. Even in those situations where participation is extensive, it is not necessarily progressive or, as perceived by CSA professionals, to be in the best interests of the community. For example, it is not unusual for participants representing more conservative or exclusionary forces to gain the upper hand (in service delivery planning groups, school/parent committees, and so on). In other cases, the active involvement of many groups with conflicting interests, or perceptions of those interests, leads to unresolved conflicts and devisiveness.

4. Where participation is a value in and of itself, strongly held by the professionals associated with CSAs, it becomes both the rationale for, and the principal activity of, the CSA. The goals of planning and resource development (which might include creating new services, changing and relocating others) take a second place behind the goals of community leadership development, consumer involvement, and so on. These, in fact, are often defined as the major service goals. When participation becomes both end and means, the goals associated with problem-solving may take a back seat to the more elusive goals associated with social development.

5. Where the professionals involved are more concerned with specific programs or with resource development, participation is often perfunctory and ritualistic. Citizens such as local residents or organizational members may be involved in order to generate their support for a plan, an idea, or a program. The participation of a few activists who have developed their own accommodation with the professionals, is often cited as proof of community support even where at best only a tiny percentage of the "community" is informed of what is happening.

b. Problems Related to Decentralization of Authority

1. In all sites visited, there seemed to be an almost inevitable conflict between the CSA's orientation toward institutional change and its responsibility for service planning and delivery. In part this was compounded by the CSA's dependence upon administrative agencies (like a municipal line agency or a ministerial department) for necessary resources and the mandate

to take action.

2. CSAs tend to have poorly-defined mandates, leading to considerable differences in interpretation. These are expressed by different people and at different times in a CSA's development. In no instances were those mandates set by the citizen participants who are their nominal constituents. In virtually every case, the official mandate and purposes of a CSA were determined by central authorities. For this reason, CSAs tend to engage in activities that support the interests of those from whom they might otherwise wish to be ideologically and structurally independent.

3. Although closer to the local populations than the administrative agencies with which they interact (government and municipal line agencies), CSAs are sometimes no more responsive or innovative than those administrative bodies. There are several reasons for this. First, there are parochialist tendencies: local people may not be knowledgeable about, or even open to, the experiences of others. Secondly, incompetent decision-making may take place, particularly where technical sophistication may be necessary. This problem can be overcome when there are technically competent professionals working with local citizens (as is often the case in the minhalot and Eshel agudot, for example). In order to be successful, however, these professionals must act as "junior" partners to their counterparts in the administrative agencies, rather than as advocates for local residents.

4. Real transfer of power and responsibility, when it does occur (as with many matnasim), also entails the responsibility for generating nearly all the resources necessary to operate. In

turn, this may divert the original purposes of the organization from community development and local empowerment to the marketing of services, many of which are not indigenous to the community. This process may be harmful to the local community in the long run. It may even be exploitative, in that it takes money from the community in the form of fees and sends it elsewhere as payment for services rendered.

Lest these problems be used to justify reduction of support for community self-help, we want to point out that most new organizations and organizational arrangements run into operational difficulties. There have been some estimates of a 60%+ failure rate of new small businesses in Israel. Even well-established businesses (major insurance and building companies) have failed recently. These failures would not suggest that business enterprises should be done away with. To the contrary, these failures can be used to pinpoint problems in the economic health of the community and to seek remedies for those problems. As in the case of business failures, the problems associated with CSAs may stem from structural inadequacies. In Section C we will explore these with the help of concepts from the behavioral sciences.

B. USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE

The Authoritativeness of Behavioral Science Knowledge

Developers and users of behavioral science knowledge sometimes presume a level of authoritativeness and utility which is an expression of faith more than of behavioral science objectivity. This

is true of researchers, program evaluators, consultants, social planners, operations, researchers, policy analysts, and the like. The reason may not be so difficult to understand. People who have invested a great deal in developing knowledge, skill, or technique, want those investments to pay off. "Give a small boy a hammer," Haifa University philosopher Abraham Kaplan once noted, "and he will find that everything in sight needs pounding."

While we want to avoid the misuse, overuse, or abuse of behavioral science knowledge, we do not want to miss the opportunity to put it to use where it can be helpful. To understand the limitations of behavioral science knowledge, it may be useful to distinguish its use in social problem-solving and development from that of ordinary knowledge, social learning, and interactional approaches to problem-solving.

Actions with regard to social problems are often taken through a variety of interactions. These include voting, arriving at informal consensus among peers or colleagues, using the market to determine programs, collective bargaining, mutual adjustment, and so on. While knowledge may inform the behavior of individuals in these processes, it can have very little to do with the outcome. For example, when members of a minhelet board vote to put more resources into services for children than for older neighborhood residents, they are not likely to base their decision either on what behavioral scientists say about the needs of children and the elderly, or on the effectiveness of one program approach over another.

Behavioral Science Knowledge and Ordinary Knowledge

Some decisions, however, and some approaches to problem-solving, are more analytic in both substance and style. They may require systematic data gathering and analysis, careful and clear definitions of problems, the examination of alternative solutions, and the specification of alternative costs and benefits. Ben-David (1977) refers to this as applying behavioral science empirical knowledge in an engineering fashion to the solution of social problems. But not all local problems require reference to behavioral science knowledge or technique in order to be successfully dealt with. Those who argue for a "universal" use of the behavioral sciences in local problem-solving or development tend to miss two points.

The first is that behavioral science knowledge is much less accessible to most people and certainly less comprehensive than ordinary knowledge (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979; Stein and Vidich, 1963). Ordinary knowledge is what we use to decide when to get up in the morning, what to eat for breakfast, how to discipline our children, how large an overdraft to allow at the bank, and to make our preferences known on children's services versus programs for senior citizens. Ordinary knowledge is composed of habit, cultural patterns, knowledge generated from experience, cues we pick up from others, and so on (Polyani, 1958). Whether it is a closer approximation of reality than behavioral science knowledge, or not, is besides the point. Rather, ordinary knowledge is generally the basis upon which we decide that there are questions we would like answered, or that perhaps we might find those answers in the behavioral sciences. It helps us determine whether to accept, reject, or ignore behavioral science knowledge.

Second, behavioral science knowledge is limited not only in its comprehensiveness, but also in its ability to help us deal with the wide range of issues that we must address every day. Lack of comprehensiveness leads to inconclusiveness; that is, we cannot prove that in this and all other like circumstances, one or another phenomenon is likely to occur.

Further, behavioral science knowledge tends not to be fully authoritative. Since most people do not employ the systematic thought processes used by the behavioral sciences, and since at least some of those processes are subject to criticism, the knowledge derived from them is frequently perceived as less authoritative than that knowledge which comes from tradition, religion, or popular opinion. The fact that there may be skepticism about the utility of behavioral science knowledge suggests that there may be limitations on its utility. There is one additional problem, that of the built-in obsolescence of behavioral science knowledge. Because people and social conditions are ever-changing, generalizations once arrived at are likely to have a relatively short half-life. Thus, one might argue that behavioral science knowledge is timely rather than timeless. This, however, may be an advantage as well as a disadvantge. Since there are few aspects of human behavior that are unchanging, authoritativeness and conclusivity may be illusive. Because the changing aspects of human endeavors are often pertinent to social problems and their solutions, one of the strengths of behavioral science lies in its capacity to examine relationships systematically.

Before moving on, we want to say a few words about social learning and what some writers call "critical consciousness" and/or

social awareness. Until the required social learning occurs, any effort to confront problems directly (with or without behavioral science knowledge) may be futile. For example, efforts to control environmental pollution may be futile until people learn different behaviors or become aware of the consequences of pollution to themselves personally. Efforts to decentralize decision-making in Israel may not be possible until the behavior of local citizens changes considerably; that is, until they become more actively involved on a voluntary basis in a wide variety of service and problem-solving activities at the local level.

Accepting the reality of such limitations should lead neither to discouragement nor to abandonment of behavioral science knowledge. To the contrary, it can be used to complement, augment, validate and/or challenge ordinary knowledge in the analytic aspects of problem solving. It can be focused on improving or correcting some of the inadequacies or inequities in interactional problem-solving. The first approach suggests a frontal attack on a social problem (analyzing it, thinking through alternative interventions, and making selections on the basis of costs and benefits); the second, by focusing on process, may improve the capacity of the critical actors to make the correct decisions. Behavioral science knowledge may also be helpful in understanding and predicting the consequences of social learning, and contribute to the development of new awareness leading to changed behaviors.

Selecting Behavioral Science Knowledge for Use

There are perhaps three basic approaches to the selection of behavioral science knowledge which are applicable to social problem-

solving and development.

The first is relatively closed and presumes a logical deductive mode of theory building. The result is a theory through which social phenomena can be understood, explained, and acted upon. Freudian and Marxist analyses are good examples.

Efforts to develop an all-encompassing and logically integrated systems approach represent another direction. We do not think there is much to recommend this approach. The pluralistic character of Israeli society and the well-documented shortcomings of each of these models or theories of social reality preclude the use of a closed logical deductive mode for problem-solving in the area of community self-help.

A more traditional approach might begin with the codification of interlocking sets of generalizations into subsets of concepts and theories. Accepting the limitations noted earlier, any of these frameworks or theories might be useful in examining the ramifications of one or another course of action around a particular problem. This approach, while conceptually intriguing, would be extraordinarily time-consuming. By itself, it would tend to be more of an academic exercise than activity of immediate (albeit limited) benefit to the community self-help organizations.

A third approach to the use of behavioral science knowledge is potentially more useful. It is both heuristic and unsystematic. It calls for using existing concepts or theories from whatever source to comprehend a problem or to the gathering and analysis of data. It makes no effort to assure the consistency of one conceptual framework or theoretical insight in relation to another. Whatever theories or concepts are available to those involved in social problem-solving

might be tested against observed reality. The question asked of a concept or set of concepts, is whether it is helpful in making a decision and taking action. Those not found useful might be stored away for possible use in the future. Theory used in this way can sharpen the questions asked of data; it can suggest which data might be required in order to be able to make more intelligent decisions. This approach is termed the "heuristic use of unsystematized theory" (Vidich and Bensman, 1963).

Using Behavioral Science Knowledge Heuristically

Used this way, behavioral science concepts become both the cause and the result of a constant change of reformulation of observations and reevaluations. By opening up the possibility of discovery it leads to what might paradoxically be called "planned serendipity". Unlike the first approach, which begins with an established theory, and the second which attempts to establish one, the heuristic use of unsystematized theory begins with the problems that are being addressed and the people who are addressing those problems. It then seeks available behavioral science knowledge (data, concepts, techniques and approaches) that might be useful in problem-solving.

For example, if, at the locality level, the problem to be addressed is defined as inappropriate or unrealistic expectations, one might go to the sociological literature on expectations for guidelines on how to either measure or modify "valence" (importance), "expectancy" (effort or action that would lead to a given end or outcome), or "instrumentality" (the likelihood that achieving that objective would lead to long-term goals or interests). Likewise, focusing on the problem of co-optation would lead one to examining the

rather extensive and robust literature on the subject (much of which might be useful in explaining a particular incident or in improving efforts at co-optation). A focus on the problems or inter-agency coordination might lead to searching the literature for insights about territorialization and the exchange process, as well as for examples of successful inter-organizational linkages.

Left at that, however, it would be far too demanding and open a process, drawing as it might from any and all of the social sciences. Too demanding because it is doubtful that persons with the range of knowledge, expertise, and experience required would be available to provide consultation to CSAs on an ongoing basis. Too open because without drawing some boundaries around the behavioral science arenas from which knowledge is drawn, it would be difficult to generate practice guidelines for use in CSAs that have some logic and consistency in relationship to each other.

Accordingly, we recommend using the conceptual framework which follows as a beginning effort to both provide some boundaries and to specify components within those boundaries that have direct bearing on the practice of community self-help. It might be better to refer to it is as a "framework of concepts". It is composed of a number of conceptual schemes which have not been integrated into a single theoretical structure and, for the reasons given, may never be.

The elements of the framework are drawn from several sources. First, and perhaps most important, they are drawn from interviews with professionals and citizens involved in community self-help. Their descriptions of the activities in which they engage and the issues they deal with, suggest a number of elements that might provide useful

insights, techniques, and knowledge for purposes of problem-solving and development. Secondly, it is drawn from an examination of the rather extensive literature in the behavioral sciences that helps explain various aspects of the community self-help process (e.g. community and organizational theory, citizen participation, and so on). Those elements that are most likely to bear fruit: (1) are such that they tend to complement both professional experience and ordinary knowledge (and thereby they may seem less foreign and are less likely to be rejected); and (2) lend themselves relatively easily to the development of practice principles or action guidelines.

What follows are tentative selections. They should not be seen as an effort to put a bridle on the heuristic use of unsystematic theory in favor of attempting a codification of theoretical perspectives leading to higher theory. To the contrary. This is no more than a beginning inventory of concepts and conceptual schemes that might be useful to practitioners in local decision-making in action - not to the social scientists interested in building a broader or more comprehensive theory. Some of the elements we suggest may be found to have little utility at the local level. Other concepts may be found to be much more useful by the participants in the community self-help associations. Their utility is subject to empirical verification (testing in the field).

C. A FRAMEWORK OF CONCEPTS FOR COMPREHENDING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITY SELF-HELP

Community Self-Help Associations

CSAs are locally based organizations in which professional service providers and planners share responsibilities with citizens/ volunteers for decision-making and action in one or more designated service sectors. These responsibilities are delegated by more central authorities and administrative agencies at either the municipal or national levels. It is on these organizations that CSAs are dependent, at least in part, for their mandates, legitimacy and resources. This definition holds true for each of the four CSAs mentioned earlier (matnasim, minhalot, Eshel, and Project Renewal).

Where they differ is in:

- the types of decisions and actions taken (i.e., nature of the delegated authority or domain of each organization);
- the nature of the shared responsibility between citizens and professionals; and,
- the sources of both the resources and the legitimacy needed to makes decisions and take action.

We shall discuss each of these briefly and then proceed to examine some of the behavioral science concepts that may be helpful in explaining how things work at the local level, and how they might be helped to work better.

Types of Decisions and Actions

The types of decisions and actions to be undertaken by a CSA vary with the nature of its mandate and domain, and it may have very little autonomy in defining the elements of that mandate. These elements usually include the following (Lauffer, 1984, 1986):

- the populations to be served (defined in terms of demographics, geographic location, and psychographics);
- the problems or services areas to be addressed;
- the nature of the services or activities to be undertaken; and,
- to what end.

CSAs can benefit considerably from behavioral science knowledge about populations and about behaviors as well as the problems that are to be addressed. The behavioral sciences also provide methods or techniques for assessment. Together with practice knowledge, it can help to determine the more effective methods of decision-making and action. For most CSAs, decision-making and action will focus on: (a) planning and development of direct service programs, and (b) coordination.

With regards to planning and development, the issues to be addressed include: (1) availability; (2) accessibility; (3) responsiveness or accountability; (4) effectiveness; and (5) efficiency.

With regards to coordination, the focus is generally on: (1) comprehensiveness; (2) continuity; and (3) compatibility. Again, there are behavioral science techniques for assessing and evaluating each of these, and for selecting alternative means for the achievement of one or the other alternative objectives. While behavioral science knowledge is not particularly helpful in determining ends or objectives, it can be helpful in the analytic process that leads to determining feasibility or weighing alternative costs and predefined benefits.

The Nature of Shared Responsibility

Questions about an appropriate division of labor in community self-help are raised on two levels: (1) the extent to which responsibilities should be shared or divided between professionals and citizen/volunteers involved in the CSA itself (Wandersman, 1984); and (2) the nature of the shared or delegated responsibility from the more central, generally governmental, authority (Warren, Schuyt and Nauta, 1986). There have been literally thousands of studies and evaluations of citizen participation efforts in Europe and the United States, in addition to the more recent ones in Israel. Most tend to limit themselves to an examination of the characteristics of the citizens involved or their collective actions as associations and social movements.

Other studies focus on the role of professionals or institutionalized structures that attempt to "involve" citizens for a variety of purposes. There have been still other studies that examined the relationships between formal organizations in what has recently been termed an "inter-organizational field" (Warren, et al., 1974). Some of these may examine the relationship between CSA-type organizations and those others on whom they are dependent for resources, legitimacy, and mandate. While it is unfortunate that insufficient attention has been paid to the connections between these two areas of inquiry (citizens and professionals in relationship to each other, and the relationship of their associations to other more formal organizations), much can be learned from the literature available. That literature may be especially helpful if we focus on two sets of concerns simultaneously.

The chart that follows is useful in mapping the range of

alternative relationships between these levels of independence and relationships. With regards to citizen involvement or participation in decision-making together with CSA professionals (within the CSA), there are several possibilities:

1. they may be given independent, discretionary authority over certain decisions and actions, with professionals having a consultative role;
2. they may be given the right and delegated the responsibility for making choice between alternatives (plans and recommended actions) prepared by the professionals;
3. they may be asked for their opinions about service need or for feedback on a proposed plan of action, but the authority to make decisions continues to rest with professionals and others in institutional positions of power; or,
4. there is no involvement or participation.

The same four categories (independence, choice, opinion and feedback, and no involvement) can also be used to describe the extent of the responsibility and autonomy delegated from central authorities to the CSA. Thus, the CSA may be given full responsibility for planning and action, or provided with a choice between alternative plans recommended by a municipal or government administrative unit, or asked to give its opinion on whether one or another plan is more or less desirable. By putting these two sets of variables together -- decentralization of authority to the CSA, and delegation of decision-making responsibility to citizen volunteers -- we arrive at the sixteen possibilities suggested in the following table.

Responsibilities Delegated to CSA by Central Authority		Responsibilities Allocated to Citizen/Volunteers in CSA			
		A Independent Decision-Making and Action	B Choice of Alternative Actions and Plans	C Opinions and Feedback	D No Involvement
A	Independent decision-making and action	AA (1) Total citizen autonomy	AB (3)	AC (7)	AD (13)
B	Choice of alternative actions and plans	BA (2)	BB (4)	BC (8)	BD (14)
C	Opinion and feedback	CA (5)	CB (6)	CC (9)	CD (15)
D	No involvement	DA (10)	DB (11)	DC (12)	DD (16) No citizen input

The two extremes on this table are boxes AA (1) and DD (16). The first is virtually total citizen autonomy in decision-making and in taking action. In the second, there is neither citizen input nor CSA involvement in decision-making or action. Around many (perhaps most) issues pertaining to the development and delivery of community services, Box 16 is unfortunately more likely to reflect the Israeli reality than Box 1. Around any particular issue, the balance is likely to shift in the direction of one of the boxes that represents a less extreme situation.

One of the difficulties continually faced by those who promote the development of CSAs and citizen participation (and those who have evaluated their efforts), is determining the appropriate levels of

citizen involvement and of CSA autonomy. In general, the range falls within boxes 1-9. In recent evaluations by Dery (1985) of the minhalot and Churchman (1985) of Project Renewal, the authors point to considerable discrepancies between the official rhetoric, which may point to the desirability of boxes 1-4, and a reality that might be reflected more accurately in those boxes characterized at least by one letter C or D. In both cases, they conclude that these are shortcomings, and provide evidence that the programs did not meet their intended goals. Indeed, this may be true.

On the other hand, it is also true that no single pattern should be expected to permanently characterize any CSA (Katan and Cnaan, 1985). It may be more appropriate to think of a mixed ecology in which different levels of responsibility are allocated to citizens in CSAs around different issues: in relation to different levels of knowledge and expertise needed to solve a particular problem at various times; or in relation to the political sensitivity of a particular issue.

Again, some of the behavioral science literature may be helpful here. We have in mind the work of sociologists who examine the exchanges between formal organizations, and between these organizations and more informal social groups. Litwak (1970), for example, shows how the level and intensity of citizen involvement may depend on the type of knowledge and expertise required for social problem-solving. In studying neighborhood programs in the United States and Europe, Warren and his associates(1986) employed this typology to postulate different kinds of problems that require high, medium, and low expertise and demonstrated that these are in inverse

proportion to community variance (values, commonly-held goals, cohesion, and so forth). Litwak also showed how community inputs were likely to be accepted and even valued when the tasks to be performed are non-routine and non-uniform. On the other hand, community participants (members, constitutents, self-help groups, families and individuals) are likely to have their input rejected when the tasks involved in problem-solving are fairly uniform, routine and bureaucratized.

Examining Several Systems Simultaneously

Building on Litwak (1966) and using an open systems approach, Hasenfeld (1978) suggested that the relationships between citizens in formal bureaucracies, as well as the relationships between organizations, can be explained and predicted by the degree of congruence between subsystems.

These systems include: (1) the boundary subsystem, through which resources are secured and products or outputs are distributed; (2) the adaptive subsystems, which focus information, knowledge and skill development on the management of other intelligence functions; (3) the production subsystem, which is composed of the technologies and related activities used to turn inputs into outputs (resources into products); (4) the managerial subsystem, which controls and coordinates actions of the various elements in each of the two systems, and often attempts to influence the decisions made in the other system as well (as when members of a citizen's action coalition attempt to influence policies in service organization, and visa versa); and (5) the normative subsystem, which reflects the "culture" of each of the two systems as embodied in their social backgrounds, beliefs, professional or ethnic

ideologies, community values, etc. Schematically, these variables might be shown as in the following figure.



The subsystems in the left-hand column can reflect the formal organization that makes up the CSA, in which case the boxes in the right-hand column would reflect the community or the citizens who are involved with professionals in the organization. Or, it can reflect the central authority, in which case the boxes on the right might reflect the locally-based CSA. Either way, we might postulate that the mechanism through which authority for decision-making and action are shared will depend on the closeness of fit between the various subsystems.

For example, if a bureaucracy employs a sophisticated planning mechanism, or deals with social problems that require considerable

expertise (as in the health field, or in housing), but members of the CSA do not possess the requisite skills to engage with the central authorities in effective decision-making, citizen inputs will either be ignored, or the central authorities will establish mechanisms for limiting their involvement in decision-making. In some cases, they may engage in community education in order to increase citizen knowledge and capacity to make effective decisions.

This type of analysis should be seen as a corrective to what is too often an ideological diatribe hidden in the jargon of the behavioral science, and frequently found in the evaluation literature. It is a diatribe which aims to prove bureaucracies uncaring, manipulative, and perhaps even subversive of democratic values. But that literature does not take into account the very real differences in the behavior patterns that might reasonably be expected of bureaucracies in contrast with primary groups or organizations that are mixtures of the two. Rather than expecting them to act differently, we suggest that policies and strategies should be based on the very extensive behavioral sciences knowledge we already have on how, in fact, they do behave, and the reasons for such behavior.

A more careful analysis of these relationships would lead to clearer understanding of where and at what point in each local situation the CSA might engage in co-production of plans and services with citizens and volunteers on the one hand, and with more central administrative agencies on the other. It would make it possible to consider a broader range of levels of responsibility for co-production, from problem or needs assessment through program design and service delivery. It is in this sense that the behavioral sciences, with

their propensity to develop typologies and descriptions, can be helpful in overcoming narrowness in perspective, and ideological bias of ordinary knowledge. It makes it possible to explore the range of alternatives, rather than to make judgements about one or two which were attempted.

Sources of Supply: Legitimacy and Resources

CSAs draw their legitimation from external sources - government agencies, local citizens who may have been involved in an electoral process for CSA board, the professional knowledge and expertise of its personnel, and they are also dependent on external sources for the resources they need to operate. The resources can be defined as any of the means and commodities necessary to achieve a mission or to maintain the organization. Among them are tangible resources such as money and credit, facilities, equipment and supplies. There are also less tangible or more ephemeral resources such as political influence, commitment and knowledge (Lauffer, 1984).

Just as CSAs are dependent on elements of their environments for these resources and for legitimacy, they also provide outputs which become the resources (sometimes in the form of services) that are required by others. These others may include individuals and families that are the consumers of social and related services, and other organizations that depend on the CSA for expertise, client referral, and the legitimacy that the CSA may be able to confer.

CSA as Mediating Structures

Because CSAs are engaged in such a wide range of exchanges with their environments, they are sometimes defined as mediating structures. This reflects their intermediary roles, that is, their

involvement in linking key elements in the environment in order to achieve some goal or objective. Those key elements may be service providers (social agencies) that require coordination in order to provide more effective services to the elderly, or they may be consumers and government agencies that require some kind of communication between them in order to achieve their objectives.

Some observers have even defined organizations like CSAs as "epiphenomena". By this it is meant that they are subject to so many counteracting forces, that rather than being able to act in their own right, they react as a result of those forces. This may be true in some situations, but generally speaking it is an erroneous assessment. It stems from the mistaken notion that the roles, responsibilities, and actions to be undertaken by CSAs are or should be set by a number of fixed rules, perhaps by explicit inter-agency agreements and contracts that spell out the CSA's functions. That, for example, is the thrust of the Dery report (1985). It is the basis for much of the internal discourse within the Chevrat Hamatnasim about the possible abandonment of community development as a goal, in favor of developing and marketing specific services and cultural programs in response to local demand. The former is central to the ideology of the matnasim. The latter approach is increasingly central to their economic survival.

Ecological Systems and Their Impact

One of the problems with the expectation that "rules" will be routenized is that it does not take into account what behavioral scientists know well: The interorganizational field within which CSAs and other organizations are involved in community planning and

decision-making has less in common with a bureaucratic system (in which the division of labor is clearly rule-governed), than it does with the characteristics of an ecological system (Levine and White, 1965). Ecological systems are bound together through systemic exchanges of a symbiotic nature, or of a commensalistic nature in which for limited time periods and for specific purposes, work proceeds jointly towards shared goods. Examples of the latter are collectivities (e.g. unions and citizens' action movements) that are bound together by common goals and ideological perspectives, or sometimes by common cultural or kinship bonds. By contrast, formal organizations are held together by official purposes and administrative structures with clear lines of authority.

CSAs have characteristics in common with collectivities, with bureaucracies, and with the ecological environments in which they find themselves. This means that any effort to define and evaluate a CSA on the basis of its proximity to the characteristics of any one of these organization types will be only partly accurate. Efforts to improve their functioning without recognizing the similarities and differences are likely to yield disappointing results.

There is a growing body of social science literature on the nature of exchange relationships, both voluntary and mandated (Litwak and Meyer, 1966; Thomson and McEwen, 1958). This literature suggests that the "closeness of fit" between subsystems is the proper focus of inquiry for those who wish to understand why relationships between organizations, or between organizations and primary groups, either succeed or fail.

The table below sketches out the relationships between subsystem

elements. Note that the relationships between citizens/consumers and staff within the CSA are themselves impacted by the variety of exchange relationships between the CSA and key elements in its environment: suppliers, consumers, legitimaters, and other organizations with which the CSA is engaged in either competitive or collaborative relationships. But note also from the diagram that even this inter-organizational field or ecosystem is impacted on by the larger environment, so that it remains forever in flux. Against this background, it is no wonder that stable, relatively unchanging structures are hard to find among many CSAs.



The Impact Environment

The impact environment is the larger social, economic and political environment that impacts on the ecosystem and that may not be subject to direct influence by any of the elements within it (Warren, 1971). Thus, efforts to develop programs, plans and actions in the face of countervailing social trends are not likely to prove successful. This suggests a need to understand the directions of those trends and to make policy judgements accordingly.

For example, efforts to mount support through intellectual arguments for decentralization of authority and responsibility may prove unproductive until there are significant shifts in societal perceptions and in social behaviors. Those perceptions would include the recognition that centralized bureaucracies are incapable of responsiveness and inefficient in the redistribution of resources, a viewpoint possibly accompanied by greater faith in local initiatives. These are precisely the perceptions that are growing in virtually every industrialized welfare state, and suggest that the move towards decentralization is deep-rooted and universal. This does not imply that a readiness exists, on the part of central authorities (in Israel or anywhere else), to fully restructure authority for decisionmaking and action.

On the behavioral level, there is ample evidence in the United States and in Western Europe of an unparallelled growth in voluntarism, expressed through the expansion of helping networks, self-help groups, and consumer participation as producers and providers of services in partnership with formal organizations. There is also considerable evidence of an initial movement in this direction in Israel. Until behaviors associated with voluntarism become much more pervasive than

they are today, however, central authorities will not be persuaded that decentralization is either appropriate or effective for the achievement of their organizational missions or for their own survival. This represents a slow process of social learning, what some observers have referred to as the beginnings of the social policy paradigm shift.

Social Learning and the Paradigm Shift

The paradigm shift is further reflected in the growth of self-help and informal helping networks supplementing formal governmental systems, and the establishment of alliances between corporate or governmental entities and community associations (Susskind and Elliot, 1983). It is also reflected in the modification of formal service structures and rules so as to take into account ethnic, cultural, and local community variations. It includes the establishment of different forms of coordination between various levels of government and citizen participation strategies.

We discussed this phenomenon in Section A as a process of social learning that is reflected, albeit slowly, in changing perceptions and behaviors. It suggests that the policies undertaken by the Joint Distribution Committee, and the programs and directions undertaken by the community self-help associations in Israel are in keeping with the directions of the larger impact environment. It does not, however, intimate that movement toward decentralization and active citizen/volunteer involvement in decision-making and action will occur overnight. Rather, it does suggest that disappointments in the slow pace of progress may reflect unrealistic expectations. For those who not only perceive the paradigm shift, but are ideologically and

programmatically committed to it, this may require a more modest yet realistic reassessment of what has been, and what can be, accomplished in the near future.

Focus on Planning

The foregoing analysis focuses on the structural components of community self-help; that is, the structural relationships between elements in social ecology that impact on the problems identified and the range of solutions possible. A more narrow focus on the processes involved in planning as problem-solving or social development might yield another series of useful concepts. Those that come readily to mind include role theory (for insights into the relationships between citizen volunteers and professionals), exchange theory (for insights into interorganizational linkages), conflict theory (which explores the functional uses of social and interpersonal conflicts), and expectancy theory (which yields insights into the use of both motivations and rewards for action).

Behavioral science knowledge can be also used to zero in on practice methods and techniques involved in problem-solving, planning, and social development. This is true whether one uses a rational, synoptic approach to planning, a transactive approach, an incrementalist approach, or what Etzioni (1968) calls a "mixed scanning" approach which attempts to integrate the best features of each of the aforementioned planning styles. For example, the tools of research can be used for assessing problems, capacities, and readiness. They can be used to analyze the relationships between variables, and for evaluating both progress and outcome.

Diffusion and Utilization

The choice of knowledge area or technique is an heuristic process. It is not limited by the lack of grand theory or a fully codified theoretical perspective. What we termed the "heuristic use of unsystematized theory" follows the schematic model of research utilization, and the R & D process described by Rothman (1980a, 1980b). It is sketched out in rough outline in the figure below.



Although this model is perhaps a bit more elaborate than necessary, its basic outlines are instructive. It begins by focusing on a specific problem of practice and examines alternative goals emanating from that problem. It then moves on to examine empirical knowledge and the retrieval of those elements that are helpful in understanding the problem, or which may lead towards a formulation of some guidelines towards action. The emphasis here is on clarification, not on absolute authoritativeness. Rather, the concern is with deriving insights from the behavioral sciences that articulate with ordinary knowledge or can be converted into practice knowledge.

The concepts are then converted into application concepts - in effect, practice principles. These are further tested for acceptability and feasibility in the specific situation. Such principles are then transformed into a set of action guidelines that can serve as a basis for local decision-making and action.

Rogers (1976) terms the next process "partialization", meaning that an intervention or innovation is attempted in a limited segment of the system. This makes it possible to test or validate the utility of the action guidelines in dealing with a specific setting or problem. Based on that experience, it is then possible to make generalizations with regards to their broader utility. This done, the concepts can be refined, elaborated and repackaged for wider diffusion. This is, in effect, a systematic way of building practice theory.

This is clearly a rationalistic approach. It suffers from all the limitations of behavioral science knowledge discussed earlier but, nevertheless, it has two distinct advantages. First, it acts as a corrective for the limitations of both transactive problem-solving and

the vagaries of ordinary knowledge. Secondly, it creates a "habit of mind", a more standardized pattern of analysis and decision-making. It makes possible the exploration of a wider range of options, and yields decisions that are made on a more informed basis. It is an approach that can be both learned and taught.

D. SOCIAL PROBLEM-SOLVING OR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

In examining the founding statements and the purposes given for their organizations by key informants in Eshel, Project Renewal, the matnasim, and the minhalot, we observed an interesting dichotomy. While social planning is essential to all four organizations, the focus and purpose of planning seems to be defined at different times either in terms of social problem-solving or social development. As we have seen, there is a fundamental difference between the two. It is around this difference that divergent opinions emerge as to success or failure, and even purpose.

Social Problem-Solving and Service Delivery

The social problem-solving approach begins with the notion that specific problems can be identified, that circumstances leading to them can be tinkered with, and, that in so doing, conditions can be bettered. This is true of any set of problems that might be identified: lack of participation; service ineffectiveness or inaccessibility; lack of service comprehensiveness or continuity or ineffective allocation of resources. Outcomes are measured in terms of the extent to which a problem has been solved or a goal achieved.

Social Development

In social development planning, one begins with a somewhat different perspective. It builds on the processes of both personal development and social learning. The concerns with personal development are most eloquently expressed in the writings of Erikson, Rogers, Maslow, Friere, Fromm, and others, who perceive such development as the result of the deliberate choices made by individuals. It is through those choices that they become more qualitatively, positively human.

Social learning occurs when personal development in a specific direction is so pervasive in a community or society that a new collective consciousness is broadly shared. This consciousness reflects itself in such behaviors as active participation or consumer demands for products to be designed in their interest.

Social development planning focuses on changing individual and collective patterns of behavior. It is aimed at humanizing individuals, their relationships, and the social institutions with which they interact. From the social development perspective, the planning process, in contrast with the plan itself, is most highly valued. This approach to planning, sometimes referred to as "emergent" planning, places the emphasis on an ongoing process. It is a process that aims at major restructuring of individual, collective, and institutional behaviors. The solving of specific problems is less important than the processes put in motion. Traditional planning steps and even problem-solving approaches may be used, but the importance lies not so much in the resolution of the problem as in the establishment of an activity system that transforms itself. What is aimed at is nothing less than a basic transformation of society.

This dichotomy between social problem-solving and social development is what energizes and imparts meaning to many of the community self-help programs established and promoted by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. Also, it is a cause of frustration to the architects of these programs. Clarity of purpose and strategy, and a recognition of the difference between social problem-solving and social development, may be necessary before expectations about outcomes can be realized. The point at issue is whether community self-help should be perceived as outcome or strategy.

Part II. ASSESSING A COMMUNITY SELF-HELP ASSOCIATION, ITS PROGRAMS, STRUCTURES AND POLICIES*

Jerusalem's Association for Neighborhood Self-Improvement has for five years encouraged and supported the development of localized, neighborhood-based minhalot (mini-governance structures) that include locally elected residents and representatives of government and municipal service providers. Each minhelet is characterized by the aforementioned concerns associated with community self-help and with the emergence of CSAs. Because all persons concerned with a particular CSA may perceive it differently, it is important to tease out the critical variables that impact on its structure, its purpose, and its operations. This may not lead to a fully common perspective, but it may make it possible to establish a common language of discourse.

The following inventory is drawn from an analysis of local Minhelet activities and functions. It includes concerns of sufficient general interest, however, to be applicable to other forms of CSAs.

Implicit in these definitions of Minhelet functions are issues pertaining to:

- service development, coordination, and delivery;
- citizen participation, bureaucratic enfranchisement, and empowerment; and,
- resource development, orchestration, and allocation.

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* Section II was prepared by Armand Lauffer for the Governing Board of the Jerusalem Association for Neighborhood Self-Improvement, composed of representatives of the municipality and the Joint.

These issues are neither mutually exclusive, nor fully complementary when dealt with operationally, and herein lies both the challenge and the difficulties faced by the minhalot. No one structure is optimal in all its facets. Decisions on emphasis may have to be made with regard to the overall structure, or community by community as they achieve different levels of maturity and experience.

Note that the emphasis in Part II is on the problem-solving aspects of social planning within the context of community self-help. Issues pertaining to social learning, social and community development and to transactive or emergent planning are somewhat underplayed. This is not because they are less important. It does reflect the time sequence (Part II was completed a year before Part I) and the issues of focal concern at the time. The astute reader will not have difficulty in finding implications for social development.

Several of the concepts discussed in Part II have been dealt with in greater detail in Part I. Others are being introduced for the first time. The two sections complement each other, however, and the reader familiar with Community Self-Help Associations should not have difficulty making the connections.

Part II includes four subsections dealing with the focus of intervention (services, participation or resources); the strategies, targets and goals of intervention; the nature and the selection of the communities to be served by minhalot (or by extension, other CSAs); and a number of operational considerations (sources of authority and resources, personnel, production and management of services).

While any inventory is likely to give focal attention to only some critical variables and leave others untouched, those included here provide a good indication of the kinds of issues that might be

better addressed with the use of the behavioral science knowledge and methods described in Part I. Note that these were identified following observation and consultation with minhalot.

A. INTERVENTION FOCUS: SERVICES AND POLICES, PARTICIPATION, OR RESOURCES

Service Development, Coordination and Delivery

When the minhelet focuses on services, it may examine need or demand, or focus on the relationships between services and service providers.

Need and demand issues can be phrased in terms of:

- availability (how much, to whom);
- accessibility (in terms of location, time, psychological or cultural dimensions);
- effectiveness (do they make any difference?);
- efficiency (can costs be reduced or benefits increased, i.e. "bang for the buck"); and,
- accountability (to whom, how measured).

The first two issues need to be addressed by both consumers and professional providers. The second two tend to be professional concerns but are too frequently ignored, to the detriment of the consumer. Nevertheless, the minhelet may have a difficult time staking a claim to the examination of these issues. The last issue (accountability) is much more political in nature, and may give minhelet staff and local activists the most grief. So long as local service providers feel themselves accountable to municipal or government supervisors or to professional norms, local residents may have little to say about the other four issues. But if local

oversight or advisory councils are established, and if they have the clout to reward or to withhold rewards, their influence is likely to be considerable.

Relationships between providers are generally discussed in terms of coordination, and coordination can be aimed at:

- continuity (service by one provider leads to those delivered by another);
- comprehensiveness (all needed services are provided, even if different providers are involved, thus reducing problems associated with fragmentation); and,
- consistency (messages and interventions complement each other regardless of their origins).

These objectives can be optimized if there is goodwill between providers, but goodwill is insufficient if services are not accountable to each other or to local residents. Thus the issue of accountability is raised once again, and this has serious implications for both the structure and the mandate of the minhelet.

Issues around which there is less clarity relate to the extent to which minhalot might be expected to become service providers when no others are available, the auspice for services, or the funder of services.

Citizen Participation, Bureaucratic Enfranchisement, Empowerment

Citizen participation can be either a goal or a means towards achieving other goals. When participation is seen as a means, people are involved in order to demonstrate support (political clout), to utilize their skills and contribute resources, to legitimate a planning effort. Their involvement is a component of a broader

strategy aimed at changing elements of the service system or the process of resource allocation by key suppliers.

Participation can be seen as a goal in its own right; an important aspect of the democratic process; an educational experience; or a social therapeutic experience in which participants are enabled to develop their perspectives, skills and capacities.

The concept of empowerment has in recent years become central to the discussion of participation in Europe, the United States, and Latin America. It refers to a process where people in power-dependent positions take increasing responsibility for programs and services of importance to them. Power is enhanced through position (i.e. membership on boards and committees), knowledge and expertise, the ability to reward or withhold rewards (penalize or coerce), and through creation of a set of mutual obligations (referent power). When consumers are empowered to make important decisions with regard to service agencies and resource providers, this is often referred to as "bureaucratic enfranchisement".

The use of participation as a goal or means is not necessarily dichotomous; frequently the process is complementary. This is not always the case, and conflicts in ideological perspectives or strategic considerations may pose difficult challenges for each minhelet. Sometimes, the purpose of participation will vary at different times in a change-inducing process. The basic ideological perspective on participation should be clear, however, so that staff receive the proper guidance.

Whatever the orientation, <u>problems associated with citizen involvement</u> can be phrased in terms of:

- knowledge (awareness, consciousness-raising, information about alternatives);
- debilitating attitudes (incapacitating sense of self or community, dependency);
- skill (ability to take collective action, leadership, committee or group management, communication); and,
- organization and structure through which involvement takes place.

The minhelet staff's responsibilities include development of appropriate mechanisms and structures for participation, leadership development, recruitment, coaching and training, advising, and mediating disputes.

Resource Development, Orchestration and Allocation

Resources can be defined as all the means and commodities used in achieving ends or goals. Resources include money, facilities and equipment, expertise, personal and professional energy, charisma, political influence and commitment. Some of these resources are more concrete, others more ephemeral. The availability of resources is no guarantee that they will be used. Thus, it is a commonplace to say that schools in middle-class communities are resource-rich because of the skills of parents working in the professions, whereas schools in lower-income or culturally deprived neighborhoods are resource-poor. This is not necessarily the case. A school is not resource-rich unless mechanisms exist to "tap" the resources potentially available, to orchestrate them effectively, and to allocate them where most needed.

Many of the essential resources, of course, are located outside the neighborhood or district of concern to the minhelet. One problem

lies in the extent to which they may or may not be available through different sources of supply (in various municipal or governmental offices, in the private or voluntary sectors). Another is in how they are allocated. Allocation may be inconsistent, discriminatory, wasteful or fragmentary. The result may be considerable duplication, gaps, or waste in application. Examples include allocation of manpower resources (e.g. psychologists) by several bureaus to different local services which might better share those resources. The same is true of buildings and equipment which might be better located and more fully shared. Because decisions are made in a fragmentary manner at the central level, local residents have little choice but to push for more resources rather than for a more adequate and planned allocation process.

Proper orchestration of resources would make it possible to mix and match those potentially available within the community and from external sources. What is now perceived as a shortage of resources may actually turn out to be a surfeit.

The minhelet's activities might therefore be aimed at:

- resource location and recruitment (finding where they are and obtaining commitments from those who have access);
- resource development (from within the community itself, in particular);
- resource allocation (influencing the allocation by others, reallocating through the minhelet); and,
- resource orchestration (proper targeting, minimized waste).

B. TARGETS, GOALS AND STRATEGIES

The foregoing suggests three types of target systems, three types of goals, and implies the possibility of three types of change strategies to be employed by minhalot.

The target of change may be identified in terms of:

- individuals and populations both within and outside the locality;
- service agencies and programs; and,
- policies and procedures that govern resource allocation and service delivery.

The goals of change may be defined in terms of:

- ideas, information, perspectives, attitudes and beliefs;
- behaviors of people and organizations; and,
- formal and informal relationships between people, between groups, and between organizations.

The change strategies can be described as:

- cooperation (in response to the consensus on goals or means);
- campaign (in response to indifference of key publics);
- contest (in response to conflicts of interest).

Selecting a Change Strategy

Cooperative strategies are most successful when there is general consensus on goals, targets, and the means to be employed to induce change. In such circumstances, the minhelet's responsibility is to provide the necessary information, to bring the relevant parties together, to facilitate decision-making, to guide action as appropriate, or to take action.

There are times, however, when consensus on goals, targets or means does not exist. There may be differences of opinion; or general

indifference and apathy. In such circumstances, a cooperative strategy may be premature. What is needed is a process whereby consciousness and awareness is raised, and people and organizations are persuaded that action is necessary. Individuals, groups, and organizations are induced to join in activity towards goals or targets of change. Campaign strategies are used in the advocacy of points of view or populations in need. Both of these strategies are common to the work of minhalot, although there may be times when staff and other participants erroneously assume consensus, when in fact, differences exist. In such cases, efforts to bring the relevant parties together may result in confusion and interventions may fizzle out. This problem is more serious when strong differences of opinion exist.

Determining Goals and Targets of Change

There may, in fact, be conflict over ends, means, or targets. In such circumstances, neither a campaign nor a cooperative strategy is likely to be successful until the opposition is either overcome, isolated, or neutralized. The resolution of the conflict may require that one side win over another, if other compromises are not possible.

This is probably the most difficult strategy for the minhelet to employ. In general, no minhelet wants to view itself as a protagonist in a struggle over ends or means. In practice, each minhelet attempts to provide a structure within which conflict can be handled and resolved in ways that are both creative and helpful to the protagonists. In reality, however, the minhelet may not be perceived by one or more of the parties to the conflict as a legitimate partner in conflict resolution, and may be perceived as the cause or

protagonist in the conflict situation. This perception may be accurate both in situations that are internal to the locality (as was the case in Mekor Baruch, a Jerusalem neighborhood increasingly polarized by ultra-orthodox and secular factions) or in situations in which one or more of the protagonists are outside the locality (as in a citizen's movement or a government bureau).

The relationships between goals, targets and intervention strategies can be depicted on a three-dimensional model, as shown on the following page. This model can be used to examine the various options available to a minhelet when it acts as a change-inducing system.



Which combinations of objectives, targets, and strategies best fit the minhalot as they are now constituted, or as they should be in the future? Box A_1, for example, might include a leadership training session for local community residents; box D_1 might include a promotional campaign related to the needs of the elderly, or a series of home meetings to raise a critical consciousness surrounding anti-drug programs for teens. Around such activities, there might be no question concerning the minhelet's involvement.

In both examples, we are acting in the realm of ideas. The targets are residents in the community, and the strategies are cooperative or campaign in nature. But what happens if we move to boxes B_2 or B_3? In the former, we would try to change the behavior of one or more service providers in relation to the problem of teenage drug use (e.g. the schools, the Kupat Cholim, the youth movements). In the second example, we would try to bring them together, to link

them in a more comprehensive and complementary service network.

But what if there is no underlying consensus? In this case, the minhelet or one of its subcommittees might engage in an advocacy campaign (E_2 or E_3), utilizing whatever resources from within or outside the locality might be helpful. It is likely that a target organization might resist all efforts to change its programs or to cooperate with others. In such cases, a contest strategy (H_2 or H_3) might be required. Is this realistic? Can/should the minhelet engage in a contest with one or more service providers within the community?

The issue may be even more difficult if we focus on policies, rules, and procedures (row CFI), and in particular if we deal with I_2 and I_3 (contest strategies aimed at changing the policies and rules governing behaviors and relationships).

How might these programmatic considerations impact on structural decisions? For example, are there some combinations of strategies, targets and goals that would be more likely in some structural arrangements, or impossible or very problematic in others?

C. COMMUNITIES SERVED BY MINHALOT

Approaches to Dividing the City into Minhelet Areas

It is commonplace to describe Jerusalem as a confederation of distinct communities and neighborhoods. This is no longer quite accurate, however. Moreover, the terms "neighborhood" and "community" tend to be used with imprecision, so that this observation does not have very much operational meaning.

In this section, we will examine three approaches to dividing the city into catchment areas: (1) proximity, size and density; (2) class, ethnicity and religiosity; and (3) functions. These can be used

independently, or in combination, to determine where to locate a minhelet, and to establish criteria for determining when an area is "ready" for a minhelet.

1. Proximity, Size and Density (Areas of Residence)

It is easier to begin by describing "areas of residence". These can be defined in terms of: (a) the housing unit; (b) the street and complex of nearby streets; (c) the neighborhood; and (d) the district. In so doing, we will avoid the pitfalls and imprecision of calling everything a "shchunah" or neighborhood, and will be able to identify those characteristics which may help us in making appropriate divisions.

Jerusalemites live in the following types of housing units: villas, or detached houses; semi-villas or semi-detached houses constructed so as to provide a sense of privacy; house and courtyard complexes in which the courtyard serves as the focus of identity and interaction for several housing units; apartment buildings, generally privately or cooperatively owned; and apartment blocks, generally public housing or a mixture of public and private ownership.

Each of these types has implications for how residents interact with their neighbors. These relationships may be mediated by kinship, ethnicity, class, density, and size. In some areas of the city, one type predominates. In other areas, they stand side by side, in sharp contrast, and elsewhere they are fully mixed.

They are also distinguishable by age and by the extent to which they were built over time or built all at once in a planned or semi-planned manner.

Streets are conveyers of foot and vehicular traffic. That

traffic may be internal to the housing complex, linking living units to each other. These tend to be alleyways, unpaved streets, and minor paved streets. They are considered purely local in character, to be walked on, and one drives or takes a bus to them.

There are also intermediate streets, which may front housing units, and which often have shopping and service areas. They serve both foot and vehicular traffic. Major streets serve primarily for vehicular traffic, linking intermediate streets, and linking the neighborhood to other neighborhoods, shopping and employment districts, and to roads leading out of the city.

The functions that streets perform are characteristic of certain neighborhoods and to a large extent help to define community boundaries. In older, more traditional communities like Nachlaot, alleyways and courtyards serve to give residents a sense of place. People may identify with Tiveria Street and feel no sense of identity with Rehov Hamadregot only a few meters away. Or they may live on Tchernichovsky Street, and not identify with that street much at all. To a large extent this has to do with the way in which the street is used. In some areas of the city, streets are used not only to get from one place to another, but to socialize with each other and to socialize children.

Neighborhoods are complexes of streets that are understood to be bound together. This "binding" can be physical, as when streets are inward-looking, most of them bringing traffic to the neighborhood and then linking housing units to each other. But the binding need not be physical alone; it can be through a shared identity. In some areas of the city the physical binding may not be as central to the definition

of neighborhood as in others.

In general, the following characteristics are common of most neighborhoods: The area has a distinct name, understood by both residents and non-residents; people who live within it recognize its boundaries; and they share in such recognition with non-residents, including public officials.

There are also a number of secondary characteristics. These include: common ties shared by neighbors (kinship, culture, religion, history or other forms of shared identity); a network of relationships, more or less primary in nature (friendship, mutual aid); institutional anchors around which neighborhood interaction takes place (schools, community centers, shopping areas, synagogue, Tipat Chalav*); agreed-upon behavioral norms (including dress, Shabbat use, type of activity permitted); and status associated with residence in the neighborhood or with having come from it.

It may be difficult to treat all neighborhoods in the same way, ror to use one set of minhelet procedures in dealing with the several neighborhoods that may be in its catchment area. For example, the responses of residents in a micro-neighborhood like Nayot to broader issues is likely to be different from those persons who live in an "in-fill" neighborhood, such as that made up of the various streets associated with Palmach or Tchnernikovsky.

A district is a section of the city that encompasses several neighborhoods and in some cases, in-fill residential areas. Newer residential areas, like Gilo and Talpiot Mizrach, are really districts

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* Mother and Child Care Centers

rather than neighborhoods. As residents begin to establish social relationships within the district, the sense of living in sub-district areas is beginning to emerge. These neighborhoods are generally the artifacts of when a sub-area was built and settled, or of the architectural design. They may, however, be modified in accordance to where service centers (e.g. schools) are located.

In contrast, the Nachlaot-Rehavia* district is almost purely an artifact of the service system, linked together because of an early effort to integrate the schools in two adjoining neighborhoods. Other, proximate neighborhoods in the Nachlaot and Zichronot area may soon be added to the minhelet district.

The linking together of older neighborhoods is in large part related to the problem of size. The newer districts are planned to house 25,000 to 40,000 persons, where older neighborhoods may house between 6-8,000 persons (e.g. Baka) or far fewer (e.g. Nayot or Nachlat Zion).

Thus far, we have identified several criteria upon which districting decisions can be made:

- types of dwelling units;
- size (25,000 - 40,000) and density;
- proximity (including in-fill);
- designation as service area (shopping, education);
- age or history; and,
- geographic boundaries.

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* Note the problem of overlapping and non-congruous service districts encompassed by schools, Tipat Chalav, Kupat Cholim, matnasim, and leshachot.

To this might be added the notion of "timing". Baka may have been an appropriate place to locate a minhelet, but size and proximity suggested the desirability of adding other neighborhoods (e.g. the Greek Colony and the German Colony). At what point should a minhelet district be expanded beyond a single neighborhood to other adjoining neighborhoods? Should each of these neighborhoods have their own mini- or sub-minhalot, at least in the initial stages of linkage? The criteria listed above seem insufficient, in and of themselves, to make districting decisions. They do not inform us as to whether it would be better to link Bet Hakerem and Yafe Nof to Qiryat Moshe and Givat Shaul, on the one side, or to Bayit ve-Gan and Givat Mordechai on the other. A third alternative might be to link them to less proximate neighborhoods with which they have other things in common: Neve Shaanan, Nayot and Neve Granot on the other side of the Givat Ram campus. These possibilities suggest another set of variables that should be considered: class, ethnicity, and religiosity.

2. Class, Ethnicity and Religiosity

In neighborhoods such as Baka and Gilo, class and ethnicity can create serious obstacles to participation or may require distinctive and differential involvement of minhelet staff with different populations, so as to equalize empowerment and skill in expressing interests. These variables, when combined with religiosity and lifestyle conflicts (religious versus secular), can create insurmountable problems. In Mekor Baruch for example, the minhelet could not continue to function.

Might it have been possible to link people by lifestyle to two different minhalot, even though they inhabit the same geographic area?

Might the secular/Edot Hamizrach population have been linked for programmatic purposes to the Zichronot-Machaneh Yehudah communities on the other side of Jaffa Road, while attaching the Ashkenazi-orthodox communities to Geula and Kerem Avraham? Or could committees have been established with different populations, with coordinating groups established as needed between them?

Returning to the Bet Hakerem-Yafe Nof example, would such life-style considerations suggest the appropriateness of a Givat Ram solution to districting rather than a more proximate neighborhood? It might be possible, for example, to consider linking Qiryat Moshe and Givat Shaul to Bayit veGan and Givat Mordechai, despite their obvious geographic separation. Would the same hold in Arab communities?

3. Functions of Community

There is another way in which districting decisions might be made: by examining the functions of community, and the extent to which the local district is dependent or independent of external forces.

Sociologists generally agree that there are four functions associated with community:

- socialization to community norms and acceptable behaviors (informally through social interaction, or formally through schools, yeshivot, etc.);
- social control (informal, or formal through police, zoning regulations, taxation);
- participation and mutual help (varies with class and ethnicity, can also be formal or informal); and,
- production/distribution/consumption (stores and shopping areas,

social assistance health and other services).

These functions are carried out through two processes: (1)primary interactions (between people); and (2) institutional interactions (between organizations). Interpersonal interactions may originate in, and focus on, people within the more proximate areas of residence. This tends to be true of older neighborhoods, and those associated with lower classes. Ethnic and religious communities may also limit interactions, but to those who are "psychologically" rather than geographically proximate. In middle-class communities, interactions are more cosmopolitan, city-wide, even national and international. These differences have implications for mutual help, participation, and sense of identity with residential locales.

In urban societies, institutional processes tend to be increasingly external to the residential area in terms of origins and control (e.g. schools, health services, safety). In more traditional communities, the locus of control over some institutions continues to be centered within the locale itself. One of the concerns of the minhalot is to create a more appropriate balance between internal and external control over institutional processes. Another is to increase the capacities of people within a given locale to interact in more socially satisfying and productive* ways.

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* The definitions of "satisfying" and "productive" may become a major issue for some minhalot.

To understand how various communities (neighborhoods, sub-neighborhoods, and districts) differ, the following two-by-two table creates a typology by crossing interactions with institutional processes.

		Institutional Processes Origin and Control	
		Within the Community	Outside the Community
Primary and Quasi-Primary Interactions	Within the Community	1. Traditional Self-Contained	2. Traditional Dependent
	Outside the Community	3. Contemporary Self-Contained	4. Contemporary Dependent

Of course, no communities match these ideal types. Nevertheless, they may help us to classify residential areas that are to be targeted for establishment of minhalot or for linkage. A-Tor, for example, might be defined as (1) "Traditional Self-Contained". Neve Yaacov might be (4) "Contemporary Dependent". When other variables are added, such as ethnicity or the extent to which there is non-residential use of the neighborhood, these might serve as criteria by which the Agudah* makes decisions.

What are the implications for structure? Would different structural arrangements be required for a contemporary/dependent district that should be moved towards greater self-containment than for a traditional/self-contained district?

** Central body of the Jerusalem minhalot.

D. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Authority and Responsibility

In earlier discussions, the Hanhalah explored several alternative models which ranged from the current situation to a decentralized city government structure (administrative or borough units). Prior to actually exploring the feasibility of these structures and relating their functions and jurisdictions to the foregoing discussion, it may be helpful to examine a number of related operational issues.

These include: Source of authority and legitimacy, source of income and other resources, employment of staff, and responsibility for the production and management of services.

The Source of Authority and Legitimacy

Each minhelet's source of authority may be secured independently, or delegated from some other source. These are, of course, relative terms. Authority is independently secured when it is:

- mandated through democratic elections, or,
- legally constituted through a public charter (i.e. an "amutah").

It can be delegated, when another legally mandated or elected body allocates all or part of its responsibility to the minhelet. Such delegation might be more or less permanent or ad hoc. It might come:

- directly from the City Council;
- indirectly from the Council through a central body such as the Agudah or some other federated body of minhalot; or,
- directly from municipal or national line agencies.

Whether independently secured or delegated, the presence of minhalot is likely to result in a shift in power to people in the neighborhoods. If this is perceived as a loss of power by resource

suppliers and service agencies, conflict may ensue. This conflict is likely to be less severe if: (1) the nature of the authority is well understood and agreed to in advance; (2) the areas of responsibility allocated to minhalot are considered relatively minor by the other parties involved; (3) the shift in authority is perceived as helpful to those parties (e.g. increasing efficiency, reducing their responsibility for problematic areas, increasing their effectiveness); and (4) local residents legitimate the minhelet's efforts through their involvement and commitment.

Sources of Income and Other Resources

The sources of income for a minhelet, at least conceivably, include the following:

- outright appropriations with general guidelines according to some formula;
- allocations with specific designations;
- grants;
- contracts;
- taxes raised by the minhelet;
- taxes raised for the minhalot;
- gifts;
- fund-raising campaigns and events; and,
- fees for service.

Outright appropriations would be made by the City Council from its tax and governmental sources of income. Such appropriations would be made on the basis of a predetermined formula that might include such considerations as: Total population, percentage of elderly or others in low income status, quality of housing and physical

infrastructure, age, number of services currently available, etc. The formula would remain the same from year to year, although each minhelet's district might be subject to annual re-evaluation as to how much it would receive.

Allocations are made by line agencies of either the municipality or the national government for the performance of predetermined tasks. A minhelet could expect that such allocations would be fairly stable from year to year, unless the municipal or government agency changes its priorities. In this arrangement, the line agency perceives the minhelet as either its functional arm or its partner. Again, an allocation formula might be used, or each minhelet might receive the same amount, or the size of the allocation might be related to the program priorities of the line agency. Some allocations are relatively open-ended.

Grants, unlike allocations and appropriations, cannot be relied upon from year to year. A grant is an award of money to conduct some work which the grantee (applicant organization) determines is necessary. It must fall within the general purview of the granting organization. Thus, the Ministry of Health may have some funds available for the care of elderly persons who cannot live independently. A grant application from the minhelet would have to address this problem, not the problems of independent living for the non-elderly handicapped. Grants may be available from private or public sources in Israel or abroad. They are limited in time, although some may be renewed.

Contracts, unlike grants, are awards for the performance of work that the funder, not the recipient, considers important. It may be

work that the funder does not wish to do directly, or for which the funder does not have appropriate competence. Military procurement contracts are examples, as are the purchases of services from voluntary institutions that increasingly characterize health and human service programs. In such arrangements, the funder sets the standards for the work to be done, specifies the time limit, amount to be spent, etc. The recipient has less discretionary authority than the recipient of a grant.

Taxes, if legal permission is given, might be raised directly by a minhelet within its own district. One method would be to levy a property tax for relatively open-ended purposes. The minhelet would then allocate the funds collected to programs and projects in accordance with its priorities. A second means would be the levying of a property or household tax for very specific purposes to be determined and costed out in advance (e.g. a school enrichment program, sports facilities, garbage collection).

It is also possible that the minhelet will not raise its own taxes, but that some new municipal tax will be established for the specific purpose of appropriating monies to the minhalot. This would operate in much the same way as other appropriations, but the money would come from a separate source rather than being reallocated from other agencies and departments. A formula would be used to determine how much each minhelet is to receive.

Gifts need little discussion. These might come from individuals or foundations, for specific purposes (e.g. adding a room to a matnas) or to be used as the recipient wishes. Gifts might be used as they come in, or invested as an endowment for operations.

Minhalot might also engage in other forms of fund-raising.

Campaigns can be employed to solicit individual gifts for a variety of community projects. Other fund-raising activities and events include: a film night or concert, walkathons, thrift stores, and so on. More ambitious fund-raising efforts are also possible. For example, a minhelet could establish a "housing corporation" to rehabilitate the local housing stock then rent or sell them to those in need. Income earned would then be recycled into further acquisitions and development. Partnerships might be sought among the banks, in government agencies, and in the private sector.

Finally, fees might be charged for specific services offered under the auspices of the minhelet. In the case of garbage collection, street cleaning, and gardening the fee might be paid in advance. In the case of a babysitting or home visiting service, the fee might be paid when the service is given. Fees can be set on a sliding scale, or everyone might be expected to pay the same for the same service. Fees could cover all or only part of the costs of service.

Some of these mechanisms imply greater or less independence and responsibility for the minhalot. Clearly, the more regular the source of income and the more stable, the greater the likelihood that the minhelet will be able to do what it sets out to do. But stability is no guarantee of autonomy. There may be many strings attached, for example, to contracts, allocations and even appropriations. The wider the range of income sources, the greater the independence of the minhelet, and the less likely that its programs will be drastically curtailed when one source dries up.

This suggests that in any decision about structure and structural

relationships, considerable attention should be given to how to obtain money. There may also be some value to examining how several minhalot, either independently, through a federated structure, or through the Agudah, might engage in jointly planned and conducted income-generating activities. The same kind of analysis might be made about other tangible resources (facilities, equipment, supplies), which could be generated from similar funding sources.

Employment and Staff

The greater its control over its own staff, the more the authority and autonomy of the minhelet. Several mutually accomodating possibilities exist, as listed below:

- staff is employed by the minhelet;
- staff is employed by the Agudah, but is assigned to the minhelet which acts as the employer in matters of assignment and supervision;
- staff is employed by municipal line agencies, and located "on-loan" to the minhelet as if they were minhelet employees for the duration of their assignments;
- staff is employed by municipal line agencies and "stationed" in local minhalot in order to do the line agency's work more effectively and efficiently, in which case they do not behave as minhelet employees; or,
- joint appointments to a minhelet and a line agency, or to a service agency in the District.

Personnel resources might also be increased through:

- supportive services (e.g. evaluation, fund-raising) provided by the Agudah;
- the recruitment, training, and assignment of volunteers, either

entirely within the minhelet, or in part by the Agudah on behalf of all the minhalot; or,

- ongoing training and staff development conducted either by the minhelet, several minhalot working together, or the Agudah.

Production and Management of Services

Implicit in the earlier sections of this paper was the assumption that minhalot are, or should be, responsible for the planning and coordination of locally-based services. Intervention efforts might be aimed at making services more available, accessible, effective and efficient, responsive and coordinated.

It is also possible that the minhelet will become the provider of certain services, when:

- services are not available from other sources;
- minhelet services are substituted for those normally provided by others (e.g. municipal garbage pick-up);
- joint service agreements are reached in which partnerships are established (e.g. managing and staffing a day center for the elderly in a local school building); or,
- contracts are issued whereby the minhelet performs the service in lieu of another party (e.g. managing a recreative program on behalf of a municipal line agency).

Under any of these circumstances, clear guidelines for management and professional standards would have to be established.

Some of the possibilities are intriguing. For example, rather than having different psychologists attached to the matnas, the schools, the Tipat Chalav and the absorption center, a minhelet

psychological service might supply the needed service to each of these organizations and their consumers. The likelihood that the psychologists involved would know the community and be committed to it would be increased, as presently they may have to run from school to school, neighborhood to neighborhood). Duplication and gaps would be reduced, as would costs. Families would be more likely to receive services that are consistent.

What are the structural implications of these different operational considerations? How are the four sets of variables (sources of authority, income, staff, degree of autonomy) related to each other and to structure? These are questions that must be answered in each locale and tailored to that locale. Following is a summary that outlines the key variables discussed in sections A, B, C and D. They may serve as reminders of issues to consider in making structural decisions.

SUMMARY PAGE

MINHELET FUNCTIONS

1. Service Development, Coordination, and Delivery		2. Citizen Participation, Bureaucratic Enfranchisement, Empowerment	3. Resource Development, Orchestration, and Allocation
Increasing Service or Program	Coordination Aimed at	Overcoming Deficits in	Enhancing Local Capacity for Resource
-Availablity	-Continuity	-Knowledge	-Location and Recruitment
-Accessibility	-Comprehensiveness	-Attitude, Perspective	-Development
-Effectiveness	-Consistency	-Skill, Competence	-Allocation
-Efficiency		-Organization, Structure	-Orchestration
-Accountability			

TARGETS GOALS AND STRATEGIES (see cube illustration, p 49)

1. Target of Intervention (within the Minhelet Locale or external to it)	2. Goals of Change	3. Change Strategies
-Individuals or Populations	-Ideas(knowledge, perceptions, skills)	-Cooperation
-Service Agencies, Programs	-Behaviors(of people and organizations	-Campaign/Advocacy
-Policies, Rules, Procedures	-Relationships (between people, organizations)	-Context

AREAS SERVED BY MINHALOT

1. Areas of Residence	2. Common Variables Used in Making Districting Decisions	3. Other Variables Important for Jerusalem (lifestyles)	4. Districting Based on Functions (internal or external influence
-Dwelling Unit	-Type of Dwelling Unit	-Social Class	-Socialization
-Streets(foot or vehicular traffic)	-Population Size	-Ethnicity	-Social Control
-Boundary Streets/Roads	-Density	-Religiosity	-Participation/Mutual Help
-Neighborhoods	-Proximity(adjoinment)		-Production/Distribution/Consumption
-In-fill Areas	-Service Areas		(see 2 x 2 table, p 58)
-Districts	-Age or History		
	-Geographic Boundedness		

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Sources of Authority (last 2 are independent, others are delegated)	2. Income Sources (or other tangibles)	3. Employment and Personnel	4. Production/Management of Services
-Democratic elections	-Appropriations	-Employed by Min.	-Does not manage/produce direct services
-Public charter	-Allocations	-Onloan from LAs	-Manages/Produces where other services not available
-City Council	-Grants	-Outstationed by LAs	-Provides substitute services
-Amutah, Agudah	-Contracts	-Joint appointments	-Joint service provision
-Line-agencies	-Taxes raised by M	* * * * *	-Provides under purchase of service(contract)
	-Taxes raised for M	-Supportive services from Agudah	-Min. issues P-of-S contract
	-Gifts (ad hoc)	-Volunteers	
	-Fundraising campaigns and events	-Staff Development	
	-Fees-for-service		

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עזרה עצמית קהילתית

דרכים ותוצאות

ארמנד לאופר

דמ-2-86

ג'וינט — מכון ברוקדייל לגרונטולוגיה
והתפתחות אדם וחברה

גבעת-ג'וינט ת.ד. 13087
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עזרה עצמית קהילתית
דרכים ותוצאות

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ארמונד לאופר

בית הספר לעבודה סוציאלית של אוניברסיטת מישיגן

*חלק א' הוכן בעזרתן של ד"ר הווארד ליטווין מהאוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים

תמצית

העניין הגובר בהפעלת עזרה עצמית קהילתית COMMUNITY SELF-HELP משקף מהפך בדרכי החשיבה - היערכות מקיפה חדשה בתפיסה של מצב הרווחה ושל תפקיד האזרחים והמוסדות המקומיים בארגונה ובפיתוחה. הוא משקף גם את העלייה במספרן ובחשיבותן של קבוצות לעזרה עצמית, אגודות שכונתיות ומערכות תמיכה לא פורמליות של התושבים, הפועלים ביחד למען מטרות משותפות. בישראל מתבטאות מטרות אלה בצמיחה של אגודות קהילתיות חדשות לעזרה עצמית, לדוגמה: מרכזים קהילתיים (מתנ"סים), מינהלות שכונתיות, אש"ל ופרויקט שיקום שכונות.

בחלק א' של דו"ח זה מפורטות ההתארגנויות לעזרה עצמית קהילתית, ושני תחומי היעד שלהן: 1. פתרון בעיות חברתיות ותכנון שירותים; 2. פיתוח חברתי ואופני תכנון חדשניים.

השימוש - לטובה ולרעה - במדעי ההתנהגות כעזר בתהליך העזרה העצמית הקהילתית, מושווה לידע מהניסיון היומיומי ולגישות אחרות, המבוססות על יחסי גומלין ועל לימוד מעשי חברתי.

דרכי ההתערבות שנוקטות אגודות לעזרה עצמית קהילתית נבדקות בהקשר לבעיות ולאתגרים העומדים בפניהן. מוצגת מערכת מושגים ממדעי ההתנהגות, ואז מועלות הצעות, איך ניתן להשתמש בהם לשם ביצוע החלטות ופעולות.

העבודה של חלק א' נעשתה במכון ברוקדייל, במימון ג'וינט-ישראל.

הדו"ח מבוסס על פרויקט הערכה ראשונית, שהתמקד בארבע אגודות לעזרה עצמית: בפרויקטים מקומיים של שיקום השכונות, אגודות מקומיות של ארגון אש"ל, מרכזים קהילתיים מקומיים ומנהלות שכונתיות המשתייכות לפרויקט ירושלים.

חלק ב' של המאמר הוכן שנה קודם לכן. הוא כולל מספר נושאים והצעות המתייחסים הן למטרות של המנהלות בירושלים והן לפעולותיהן.

תפקידי המנהלות, כמו פיתוח שירותים ותיאום במתן השירותים, נבדקים

לפרטיהם, על רקע השינויים החלים במקורות התמיכה הציבורית והמימון הדרוש. כן נבדקו דרכים לשינוי, הכוללות ריבוי מטרות ומערכות יעד. המשתנים שיש להתחשב בהם בעת הקמת מנהלת (שטח גיאוגרפי, השתתפות וחברות) נבדקו ביחס להגדרות של "תפקידי הקהילה".

בסוף חלק ב' מובאת רשימת ההחלטות לפיתוח תהליך העזרה העצמית הקהילתית, ולארגון אגודה לעזרה עצמית קהילתית.

רוב העבודה על חלק ב' מומנה גם היא על ידי ג'וינט-ישראל, אך היא הושלמה שנה קודם לכן, כאשר ארמנד לאופר שימש יועץ להנהלה של פרויקט ירושלים לקידום עצמי של שכונות.

חלקים א' ו-ב' דנים בנושאים דומים מאוד, והם משלימים זה את זה בכך ששניהם מסתמכים על אותו ידע התנהגותי ואותן שיטות, המתאימות לעזרה עצמית קהילתית ולאגודות לעזרה עצמית בישראל.

תוכן עניינים